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Undoing Ableism: Disability as a Category of Historical 
and Legal Analysis 
_Abstract  
In this essay, I will apply disability as a category of legal and historical analysis to 
undo the different forms ableism can take in US history and law. My aim is to look at 
a specific time period in US history – the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth 
century – in order to elucidate narratives of exclusion and marginalization of disabled 
people on the one hand and resistance and resilience on the other. My claim is that in 
this period, disability gains particular political and legal relevance as an intersectional, 
i.e. a gendered, classed, and racialized category of analysis, which leads to the cross-
connection between ableism and other dominant ideologies, such as sexism, racism, 
and classism.  
In order to give my analysis historical and cultural specificity, I will look at two 
distinct historical and legal contexts. In the first part of this essay, I discuss the inter-
relation of ableism and classism in the context of the industrialization and the subse-
quent socioeconomic discrimination of disabled factory workers. As a legal subtext, 
the fellow servant rule will be discussed to understand how this particular law be-
comes relevant for disability politics.  
In the second part of the essay, ableism is explored in the context of racism to 
understand how atavism and biological determinism contributed to the othering of 
disabled people, especially disabled women, in the context of eugenic ideology of the 
early twentieth century. Here I will discuss the US Supreme Court decision for the 
case Buck v. Bell in order to understand eugenic law as a reflection of an ideology that 
is both ableist and sexist at its core.  
“Disability is everywhere in history, once you 
begin looking for it, but conspicuously absent in 
the histories we write.”1 
There is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of disability politics. While Anglo-
phone disability studies argue for the inherent politicity of disability as a legal and po-
litical issue, disability as a category of analysis remains largely absent from historical, 
political, and legal discourse.2 To make matters even more complex, ‘disability’ has 
more than one meaning. There is the medical model of disability, which understands 
disability as functional impairment and makes visible the ways in which a body does 
not function in the way it is expected to.3 This results in activity limitations (i.e. re-
stricting a person’s ability to do certain activities such as seeing, walking, hearing, and 
problem solving) and participation restrictions, which excludes a disabled person from 
daily activities, such as working and social activities.4 On the other hand, there is the 
social model of disability, which puts disability in a broader context of societal and 
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environmental factors and views impairment as the result of physical and social barri-
ers. In other words, people are not disabled by their diagnoses, but by a society that 
equates disability with deficit. Therefore, impairment is inherently and irrefutably neg-
ative in the eyes of the dominant ableist ideology.5  
In historical and legal discourse, the conceptual distinction between the social and 
the medical model of disability proves to be even more complex. As disability scholar 
Douglas C. Baynton points out, historicizing disability means recognizing the political 
dimension of disability as a complex and intersectional category of historical analysis, 
one in which the medical and medicalized beliefs about the ‘disabled’ body have an 
immediate political dimension. In Baynton’s view, ‘disability’ has been used exten-
sively to justify racist and sexist discrimination against people who are disabled and 
people who are not disabled but are perceived to be because they are thought to be 
‘inferior.’6 One example that comes to mind is the systemic degradation and dehuman-
ization of African American slaves as cognitively impaired, which served as one of the 
ideological legitimizations for slavery.7 Here, the boundary between the medical and 
the social models blurs. Disability denotes not only a form of impairment attributed to 
a specific group of people in order to degrade them, but it also characterizes a specific 
way of thinking about bodies, appearance, and normalcy. To apply disability as a cat-
egory of analysis thus means to pay attention to the ways in which the boundary be-
tween the medical and the social model of disability turns into an intersection of spe-
cific ideologies that view non-normative bodies as ‘inferior,’ such as ableism, racism, 
and sexism. As disability turns into deficit, ableism becomes hegemonic: the belief that 
disabled people need ‘fixing’ in order to function turns into the ideological basis that 
equates disability with deficit.8 Consequently, disability as a category of analysis can-
not be ignored as these forms of exclusion cannot be unseen, yet historical analysis 
outside of disability studies often remains quiet on disability as a category of analysis, 
reducing it to “personal tragedy.”9 
My aim is to counter this absence and the silence it implies. In this essay, I apply 
disability as a category of historical and legal analysis to elucidate narratives of exclu-
sion and marginalization on the one hand and resistance and resilience on the other. 
Rather than giving a diachronic overview of disability history in its entirety, however, 
my focus for this essay lies on a specific time period: the turn from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century in the US. In this period, disability as a category of analysis gains 
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particular political and legal relevance as an intersectional, i.e. a gendered, classed, and 
racialized category of analysis. To tease out these interconnections, this essay is divided 
into two parts. First, I discuss the interrelation of classism and ableism during industri-
alization. Here, I explore how disability and social class figure in the marginalization 
of disabled factory workers and how the common law system, in particular the fellow 
servant rule, supports systemic modes of discrimination. In the second part of this es-
say, I then move to the intersection of ableism and racism and discuss eugenic ideology 
in the context of biological determinism and atavism. As a legal case, the Supreme 
Court decision Buck v. Bell will be discussed in depth to make visible the gendering of 
disabled and poor women in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in the US. 
Starting in 1780 in Britain and spreading to “other areas of Europe, the United States 
and Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century,” the Industrial Revolution marks 
one of the major disruptions of that period.10 Following an increase in industrialized 
factory work, urbanization with large improvements in infrastructure and a “demand to 
fill factories,”11 the concept of work underwent fundamental changes as labor became 
increasingly commodified.12 Working hours increased up to sixteen hours per day in 
factories in 1850, while working conditions decreased in quality, leaving workers to 
shoulder long hours in mass production without access to fresh air, exercise, healthy 
food or basic medical supervision and care.13 As a consequence, it was not simply labor 
that became industrialized as factories were built. Rather, as Frederic Jameson argues 
in The Political Unconscious, it is an entire value system that is being replaced: the 
transgression from the ancien régime to “capitalist market society” is marked by “new 
conceptualities, habits and life forms” and one of these values is the ability to work, 
commodified and hegemonized as able-bodiedness.14  
The disability politics implied in this paradigm shift become apparent when consid-
ering the transition from agricultural to industrialized forms of production that pro-
duced and politicized forms of dis-ability and dis-ablement. As disability scholars Mi-
chael Oliver and Colin Barnes point out, in an agricultural economy reminiscent of the 
ancien régime, the emphasis on “traditional craft skills” as well as “community ties” 
resulted in a participatory and inclusive work environment as far as disabled people 
were concerned.15 In fact, disabled people were en-abled by the modes of feudal pro-
duction “in which neither labor nor its products are commodities”: being disabled and 
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being productive as a body that (literally) works was not perceived as mutually exclu-
sive.16 With labor being integrated in a seemingly “natural”17 – or as I would argue, 
naturalized – economy, “a relatively intimate union between domesticity and labor” 
opened up: disabled family members were given tasks in the household “to keep it fed 
and warm”; they “contributed what they could.”18 This illustrates the historical and 
cultural specificity of disability as a category of analysis: in systems of agricultural 
production, disability was not associated with forms of intrinsic deficit as it was during 
industrialization.  
Another example of the cultural specificity of disability in pre-industrialized times 
is the advent of early US Deaf culture among deaf settlers on Martha’s Vineyard.19 In 
the community, a specific form of sign language – Martha’s Vineyard Sign Language 
(MVSL) – was established as the community’s official language next to spoken US 
American English to account for the fact that the majority of settlers were deaf and 
native signers.20 To be fair, one could argue that the establishment of MVSL is the 
outcome of an evolutionary process. Deafness was caused by a gene defect which 
spread in the community, thus learning sign language seemed the logical consequence 
in order to facilitate communication among settlers.21 However, returning to the politics 
of disability, I want to point out that the relation between MVSL and Spoken English 
is inherently political: it subverts deafness’s status as ‘other’ and challenges the pho-
nocentric and audist hegemony of verbal language as the ideologically dominant and 
normalized form of communication.22 Returning to Jameson, in a community reminis-
cent of the ancien régime, a moment of “cultural revolution” was thus already present, 
which turns the hegemonic power relation between disability and able-bodiedness on 
its head through sign language as a signifier of Deaf cultural resistance against phono-
centrism and audism. In other words, on Martha’s Vineyard, those who did not know 
MVSL were the ones impaired, while the formerly “hearing-impaired” entered a posi-
tion of power marked by the ability to communicate and to be understood.23 This then 
puts another spin on disability as a category of analysis and the politics implied in the 
historicization of disability. There is a conceptual and ideological tie between the con-
struction of impairment and modes of social exclusion, which is a point I shall come 
back to later in this essay. 
Turning to capitalist wage labor, this relation changes fundamentally. It is important 
to note that capitalist work and labor in this context are not just opposites of the work 
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that was done in pre-industrial times. Instead, work emerges as another central category 
of analysis, one that politicizes disability in the context of social exclusion, socioeco-
nomic disadvantage, and legal discrimination. As the commodification and commer-
cialization “of land and agriculture” increased, a call was made for a “new category of 
worker”, able to face and shoulder the long hours in mass production. 24 In this context, 
commodified modes of production renegotiate the power relation between disability 
and able-bodiedness. And while Foucault characterizes the factory as a place that dis-
ciplines workers into normalcy as a form of able-bodiedness,25 I would argue that the 
hegemonization of able-bodiedness works the other way around, through the systemic 
othering and classing of disability as fundamental and intrinsic deficit. 
To give an example: During the process of industrialization, working-class families 
were, as Lennard J. Davis puts it, “redistributed into the factory orbit,”26 segregated 
into neighborhoods that made it more likely for people to become disabled through 
poor hygiene and a lack of basic medical care.27 With factory workers being at substan-
tial risk for physical disabilities such as spinal deformities due to the high workload 
and poor maintenance in factories both in Europe and in the US, the capitalist value 
assigned to being disabled was inherently negative.28 Becoming disabled resulted in 
losing one’s skills as a worker, and turning from a working-class, disabled person into 
a poor, disabled person, meant an increase in societal stigma, as ‘pauperism’ was os-
tracized both in the US and in Victorian England.29 As a consequence, disability as a 
category of analysis becomes political. The disabled, working-class body signifies dif-
ference intersectionally on more than one level. The power relation between disability 
and able-bodiedness is now characterized both by Marxist politics of owning capital30 
and disability politics of having access to that capital. Those who have no or limited 
access “to economic, social, and cultural resources” are thus disabled by the system at 
hand.31 Consequently, the hegemony at the heart of able-bodiedness emerges as two-
fold. On the one hand, it is capitalist because it is produced through and constructed by 
capitalism as an “abstract concept” and on the other hand, it is ableist, because hege-
monic able-bodiedness perpetuates the belief that bodies need to be able-bodied to 
work, which puts those ill-equipped to function in the system in capitalist limbo.32  
This mode of othering disability through ableist and capitalist dominance is rein-
forced by nineteenth-century common law that regulated factory work and normalized 
able-bodiedness through the figure of the “self-made American man.”33 Following 
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Rosemarie Garland-Thompson’s argument, the concept of work is political, because it 
carries a specific cultural connotation in the US historical context. “The abstract prin-
ciples of self-government, self-determination, autonomy, and progress” all feed into 
ideologically dominant narratives such as the American Dream, which makes the oth-
ering of disability through common law complex, as more than one hegemony – and 
more than one form of othering – is involved.34 What is also important to consider in 
this context is, as Lawrence M. Friedman argues, that there is no such thing as ‘the 
law.’ Instead, there is a difference between “the law itself, structures and rules” and the 
social and legal forces that, in some way, “press and make the law.”35 This observation 
has led to the denaturalization of law as narrative.36  
Subsequently, a contextualized understanding of legal rule as “narratively based and 
culturally embedded” emerges, which politicizes the relation between law and disabil-
ity.37 When unpacking the ways in which disability becomes ‘other,’ looking at the 
power relation between disability and able-bodiedness is not enough. One also needs 
to look at the power relations that the law is immersed in, as legal narratives and insti-
tutions negotiate the legal and political relationship between disability as a category of 
difference and law as mode of reading difference. On the one hand, the law-and-narra-
tive paradigm argues that law is composed of a set of narratives that “situate, explain, 
and legitimize their prerogative.”38 Yet on the other hand, these narratives also reflect 
on the ways in which law is bound up with the making of norms through institutions, 
which turn law into a narrative of institutionalized norms and power.39 
When looking at the legislative make-up of the American “self-made man” and the 
US Supreme Court decisions involved in the making of this man, the fellow servant 
rule from 1842 is a telling example, as it illustrates how legal narrative serves as a tool 
to marginalize, oppress, and class disabled people.40 One Supreme Court decision that 
plays an important role in making this law ideologically dominant is the ruling in the 
case Osborne v. Morgan et al. In this case, John Osborne, a carpenter working in a 
factory in Worchester, was injured by an iron block that had fallen on him. Because the 
block had been put on an iron rail by his fellow workers (or “servants”), violating safety 
precautions, Osborne decided to take the company to court. The Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts dismissed the case, justifying its decision as follows: 
The master’s rights of action against the defendants would be founded upon his 
contract with them, and his damages would be for the injury to his property, and 
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could not include the injury to the person of this plaintiff, because the master could 
not be made liable for him for such an injury resulting from the fault of fellow-
servants, unless the master had himself been guilty of negligence in selecting or 
employing them.41  
In this legal narrative, a specific politics is sewn into the rhetorical fabric: the power 
relation between “master” and “fellow servant” and its connection to disability and 
able-bodiedness. In the paragraph cited above, both are understood to be “autonomous 
agents entering freely into a contract” and that notion of “contractarian economic indi-
vidualism”42 makes it impossible for workers “to sue their employers for damages if a 
coworker was responsible for the injury.”43 And while one could argue that the fellow 
servant rule is but one example how “[the legal system] promote[s] economic growth,” 
it is important to consider this law in a disability-related context to understand its im-
plications as a narrative that excludes disabled people and other people’s assumed dis-
ability.44  
In light of the fact that factory workers were already marginalized because of their 
fragile socioeconomic position, those who had been injured at work and became disa-
bled were put in a position of even more severe financial precariousness. They became 
dependent on “charity or poor relief” and were further marginalized as poor and disa-
bled in society.45 Consequently, Osborne v. Morgan gives legislative and ideological 
form to the “belief in the link between ‘hard work’ and economic and societal success;” 
a belief that is also at the core of exceptionalist narratives such as the American Dream 
and the “self-made” American man.46 Able-bodiedness is thus imagined as the body of 
a ‘self-made’ all-American worker while the intersection of social class, poverty, and 
common law transmogrifies disability into a capitalist nightmare, a form of ‘personal 
tragedy’ that results in severe socioeconomic disadvantage.  
In the context of industrialized expansion and US colonialism another grim histori-
cal and legal subtext evolves that denaturalizes and exposes the image of the quintes-
sential ‘self-made’ and ‘self-governing’ American man as ableist and racist:47 ‘The 
1830 Indian Removal Act’ passed by Andrew Jackson in 1830.48 To justify the passage 
of the Act and the subsequent genocide of Native Americans, Jackson delivered his 
‘State of the Union’ speech in which he contrasted the image of a progressive, indus-
trialized US nation, “our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosper-
ous farms,” with the racialized picture of Native Americans as “savages.”49 What is 
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important to note here is that the stereotype of the noble savage who “liv[es] comfort-
ably with nature” and in “close harmony with their local environment”50 has been in-
strumental not only in the othering of Native Americans,51 but also of cognitively dis-
abled people.52 A complex intersection between disability and race unfolds in which 
racist able-bodiedness and ableist racism emerges, pushing those who do not conform 
to the hegemonic ideal of the ‘self-made American man’ to the margins. The ‘Indian 
Removal Act’ creates a narrative of marginalization, a complex narrative of social ex-
clusion that oppresses those perceived to be ‘different’ and feeds into pre-existing na-
tionalist, racist, and ableist ideologies of the nineteenth century. 
This intersection between legal narratives of exclusion, racism, and ableism is made 
more complex when taking into account the concept of legal personhood. As Barbara 
Young-Welke points out, one of the ways to be ‘other’ in law is through a form of 
“imagined legal personhood” that racializes and genders legal rights and frames them 
as belonging solely to white men.53 Here, the category of legal personhood emerges as 
a tool to create “legal borders of belonging,” distinguishing between those who “[bear 
legal] rights and duty” – and belong – and those who do not.54 In the case of Osborne 
v. Morgan, this legal border is institutionalized by the Supreme Court decision, which 
renders legal personhood “a product of [a] legal institution.”55 Consequently, the image 
of the “self-made” worker feeds into legal narratives of exclusion and marginalization. 
It perpetuates the image of ‘the’ white man as someone who holds legal rights and legal 
personhood and excludes those who are not in fact white, male, and “self-made” work-
ers.  
In this context it is important to note that the history of legal personhood as a narra-
tive of exclusion goes back to Roman law. In Roman law, persona was used to distin-
guish between “holders of civil rights” and “those who lacked such civil personhood: 
women, children, slaves, and foreigners.”56 Returning to legal borders of belonging, 
legal rule now unfolds as a narrative of able-bodied privilege and disability passing. 
For instance, a deaf individual who was oral and could communicate through spoken 
language was considered to be a person with legal rights, a persona, whereas those who 
were unable to communicate orally were denied their rights.57 This distinction turns 
legal personhood into a concept through which a specific norm is communicated,58 the 
norm of able-bodiedness. This norm normalizes citizenship and reinforces the role that 
legal personhood plays in legal narratives of exclusion and discrimination.59  
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Taking this argument further, one can say that the fellow servant rule gained political 
significance not only in the context of industrialization and Native American history 
but also in the context of slavery. Under bailment law, slaves who had entered the in-
dustrialized workforce were perceived to be “rented property.”60 This mode of dehu-
manizing slaves and denying them legal personhood was subsequently supported by 
the Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court decision. In the decision, the Supreme Court ruled 
that “no black had been or could be a citizen of the United States, and therefore no 
black could bring suit in a federal court.”61 This brings back the ableist and racist pol-
itics of US Supreme Court decisions, as Dea H. Boster observes: “Southern courts […] 
explicated that no one could presume [that] African American slaves would have the 
intelligence or capability for self-governance to make their own decision.”62 Now keep-
ing in mind that from the eighteenth century onwards so-called scientific racism sought 
to legitimize racial inferiority on the basis of physical characteristics such a skull shape 
and size,63 bailment law and Scott v. Sandford evolve as part of a legal narrative of 
exclusion that is deeply racist at its core, not only because it posits a slave as a non-
citizen and thus excludes African Americans from the legal imagination. Much more 
so, this particular legal narratives gives legislative form to what Rosemarie Garland-
Thompson calls the “biologiz[ing] [of] cultural difference.”64 Applying Garland-
Thompson’s argument to the category of legal personhood as part of a legal narrative 
of exclusion, the binary between Western white and African American bodies is 
strongly reinforced through the category of legal personhood as a narrative of social 
exclusion and marginalization. In racializing slaves as being disabled, bailment law 
gave form to the intersection of ableism and racism, perpetuating not only the hurtful 
image of a slave being less than a human being but also the image of disability as 
fundamental and non-human difference. 
The connection between biological determinism, racism, and legal narratives of ex-
clusion then leads to another major historical and legal subtext that figures large in the 
construction of disability as otherness: eugenics. To understand how the eugenics 
movement others disability through laws passed in its favor, it is import to consider the 
ideological core of this paradigm. In Inquiries into the Human Faculty, British poly-
math Francis Galton coins eugenics as: 
The brief word to express the science of improving the stock, which is by no 
means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case 
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of man [sic], takes cognizance of all the influences that tend in however remote a 
degree to give the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of pre-
vailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had.65  
While anything but brief, this quotation illustrates how the roots of eugenic thought run 
deeper and go beyond the medical model of disability, which understands disability as 
cognitive and physical impairment. By applying a politics of form perspective to Gal-
ton’s rhetoric, terms like “improving,” “judicious,” “race,” and “blood” play a key role 
in the polarization and politicization of ability and disability as opposing categories of 
human worth.66 A tone reminiscent of the ‘father knows best’-figure67 suggests a sense 
of assurance and objectivity through the seemingly objective register of “the science of 
improving the stock” and “judicious mating” (of people, not cattle, even though the 
term might suggest otherwise). Consequently, further ideological ground is laid for the 
hegemonization of able-bodiedness. In a quotation that lacks the word human, it seems 
tautological to note that the rhetoric is dehumanizing. Yet this move is central to eu-
genic ideology: to introduce a power relation that plays off one category (the “more 
suitable races or traces of blood”) against another (those “less suitable”) in a polariza-
tion and nationalization of health and fitness.  
To understand the “science” Galton refers to, it is also necessary to historicize this 
definition and to put it in the context of a wider network of ideologies, including social 
Darwinism and biological determinism. With Charles Darwin – Galton’s cousin – pub-
lishing On the Origin of the Species in 1859, the idea of biological fitness was first 
introduced as “the outcome of a selective process.”68 However, it is not Darwinism that 
informs Galton’s understanding of “science” and “fitness,” but rather how the Darwin-
ist idea of selection is interpreted in the wake of social tensions at the turn of the nine-
teenth to the twentieth century in the US. After the Civil War, a number of socioeco-
nomic disruptions occurred. The processes of industrialization, urbanization, and im-
migration intersected, cities became overcrowded, and the industrial work force be-
came more competitive, while wages sank below the national poverty line of $500 p.a. 
in 1880.69 Moreover, unemployment and poverty were propelled by disruptions such 
as the “economic panic of 1893,” which resulted in ever more socioeconomic hard-
ship.70  
 As a consequence, the overall societal attitude towards socioeconomic disad-
vantage and disability became polarized. In the wake of social and economic disrup-
tions, cognitively disabled people were perceived to be ‘other’ in a way that paved the 
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road for eugenic ideology. Cognitive impairment was understood to be a hereditary 
‘root cause’ of poverty and crime, and a threat to the prevalent social order, which 
merged modes of othering disabled people with eugenic and biologically deterministic 
ideology.71 Ironically, at the same time (after the Civil War), the manufacturing of ar-
tificial limbs turned into a thriving business,72 which led to the commodification and 
iconization of physical disability. The following advertisement for leg prostheses is 
particularly interesting in this context as it links social exclusion back to issues of social 
class and gender: 
 
        Fig. 1: Advertisement for leg prostheses (1891)73 
The image in Figure 1 features a young man wearing a removable below-knee prosthe-
sis called “artificial legs.” In this advertisement, physical disability is heavily classed, 
gendered, and ultimately normalized. By wearing what counted as “middle-class” attire 
at the end of the nineteenth century, the dark, smart jacket, bow tie, black trousers and 
white tights are key to the image of a young middle-class consumer whose socioeco-
nomic, race, gender, and age privilege normalize his disability and render it societally 
accepted.74  
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On a second level, the visual rhetoric in this image plays into the construction and 
normalization of physical disability. A medium shot turns the man into the central ele-
ment, which puts further visual emphasis on the prosthesis as a marker of able-bodied-
ness. This is reinforced by the fact that his leg stubs remain invisible. Instead of pictur-
ing mutilated or scarred flesh, the pair of clinically white tights suggest that this is a 
‘normal,’ non-disabled body after all. Furthermore, the fact that the prosthesis is posi-
tioned at the center of the image distracts the gaze from the body of the man to the 
prosthesis itself and the technical detail with which it has been produced. The polished 
leather ankle boots and white leg sockets suggest that this is a hand-crafted product 
worth the money and the looks if one wants to pass as able-bodied and affluent as one 
can be. Consequently, the leg prosthesis in this image goes beyond the prosthesis as a 
mere “technical object” and “non-human agent.”75 In this image, the prosthesis is what 
makes the man human in the eyes of a capitalist and ableist ideology that turns physical 
disability into a commodity, while passing as able-bodied disabled turns into an im-
plicit performance of privilege.   
Returning to the visual rhetoric of this image, the scenic composition of the image 
also indirectly ties into the notion of class and socioeconomic privilege. Visual ele-
ments such as the fur rugs on the floor, the artificial tapestry, the curtains in the back-
ground as well as the fact that the man is seated on a wooden chair and faces the camera 
upfront all evoke the genre of the “bourgeois studio portrait,” which presents a rather 
picturesque image of disability as commodified class privilege.76 By placing visual em-
phasis on the fact that this young man looks just like any other man from the same 
social background, disability passing becomes political once more. In the image, being 
able to pass means to perform financial affluence and middle-class privilege, which 
sets the man in the advertisement apart from physically disabled factory workers, who 
were unable to afford prostheses of this kind.77  
This point leads me to another legal narrative of social exclusion. It is no coinci-
dence that in 1881, ten years before the advertisement was published, the ‘American 
Ugly Law’ was passed, which made it unlawful for physically disabled, disfigured, and 
other ‘visibly’ disabled people to appear in public.78 Consequently, the ‘Ugly Law’ 
links the commodification of disability back to the marginalization of physically disa-
bled and poor people. Those who could not afford expensive prostheses were consid-
ered to be “unsightly and disgusting objects” and “improper persons,” while those who 
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could afford and were willing to wear prostheses were re-humanized as holders of civil 
rights.79 Consequently, a legal discourse unfolds that, similar to Roman law’s granting 
civil rights to deaf oral individuals, assigns legal personhood on the basis of how well 
a disabled person passes as able-bodied. The binary between disability and able-bod-
iedness as opposing categories of human worth is thus reinforced through the opposi-
tion of ‘person’ versus ‘object’ in a legal narrative in which socioeconomic disad-
vantage and the loss of human and civil rights accumulate under the label ‘ugly.’ 
When looking at the othering of disability on the other hand, the politics of this 
discourse backfire. While images of affluent young men were published to commodify 
and normalize physical disability, social Darwinism offered the explanation that other 
disabilities, especially cognitive and intellectual impairment, cause poverty, alcohol-
ism, and crime.80 As a corollary, specific forms of impairment came to be associated 
with atavistic regression and degeneration, which racialized and animalized the disa-
bled body that could not pass as able-bodied. To give two examples: Down’s Syndrome 
was initially defined as ‘Mongolism’ in 1866, i.e. “the result of a biological reversion 
by Caucasians to the Mongol racial type.”81 In this definition, the “Mongol racial type” 
signified the difference that was thought to make “Mongolism” pathological and ata-
vistic. This illustrates the close ideological ties between ableism and racism in the oth-
ering of disabled people.  
Another example is the connection between ableism, biological determinism, and 
oralism. Following the emerging ‘school’ of oralism in the late nineteenth century, 
American Sign Language (ASL) was banned in schools in an attempt to force deaf 
individuals to communicate through oral speech, which oralists viewed as ‘superior’ to 
signing.82 As oralism became prominent, capital-D Deaf individuals who used sign lan-
guage as their native language were compared to “apes”83 and this form of degrading 
and animalizing Deaf people led to the audist dismissal of sign language as “crude 
slang [l]inguists taught […] to apes and chimpanzees.”84 As a consequence, the inter-
section of racism, ableism, and biological determinism turned the relation between dis-
ability and able-bodiedness into a binary opposition between ‘animal’ and ‘human.’ 
Deafness and Deaf culture (which sign language is a part of) were animalized to the 
extent that the disabled, deaf, and signing body now embodied intrinsic, non-human 
otherness, and this difference in turn completed the ideological move social Darwinism 
makes from viewing disability as difference to disability as deficit. 
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Social exclusion, marginalization, and animalization resulted not only in the increas-
ing institutionalization and segregation of cognitively disabled people in custodial asy-
lums and so-called poor farms at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century 
but also in the broadening of (cognitive) disability as a one-size-fits-all label for those 
who were seen as socially deviant.85 On the basis of IQ tests that were inaccessible 
because of language and educational barriers,86 cognitively disabled people, immi-
grants, and poor people who scored below a certain average87 were given labels that 
stigmatized and criminalized them on more than one level. Terms such as “imbecile,” 
“moron,” and “idiot” reinforced the connection between being disabled and being de-
valued as a human being,88 while able-bodiedness translated not only into “scores av-
erage on an IQ test,” but also into “college educated,” “middle class,” and “white” – a 
bias US American eugenicists used as the basis to reinforce the supposed ‘superiority’ 
of the middle class.89 
Going back to the image I discussed in Figure 1, it suffices to say that the connection 
between disability and social class presents itself as ever more ideologically loaded. 
The implicit image of ‘the’ able-bodied person as white, middle-class, highly educated, 
and male was reinforced through the systemic othering of those who did not confirm 
to this image, bodies that were everything but human under the gaze of social Darwin-
ism and biological determinism. As a consequence, the “science” Galton refers to is to 
be taken with more than a grain of salt. Social Darwinism does not turn disability into 
a ‘scientific’ category, as it were. Instead, ‘science’ signifies a complex process of oth-
ering that turns disability into shorthand for ‘deficit’ and ‘deviance,’ while able-bod-
iedness once again becomes ideologically dominant through the white, Western, ‘ge-
netically sound,’ all-American body.  
The perceived threat of cognitively disabled people – and those perceived to be cog-
nitively disabled – was not only influenced by eugenicists who used Social Darwinist 
rhetoric to legitimize the systemic and cruel criminalization and oppression of disabil-
ity. On a more subtle level, eugenicists also employed photography to turn their label 
of cognitive disability as embodied social deviancy into a visual diagnosis. When look-
ing at the photographs in eugenic textbooks, visual discourse is little but diagnostic. 
Instead, it turns into the gendered exhibition of cognitively disabled women: 
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Fig. 2: “Case 324. Hattie, Age 23. Mentally 3.” (1914)90 
In the image depicted in Figure 2, the visual rhetoric employed by the photograph 
seems at first sight to match Galton’s ‘scientific’ register. A cognitively disabled 
woman identified as “Case 324: Hattie, Age 23. Mentally 3” by the image’s subtitle, is 
depicted in two shots, one a medium close-up shot of her face and her upper body, the 
other a medium close-up shot of her facial profile and her body next to a measuring 
device depicting her height (c. 1.55m).91 The specific combination of these two shots 
–one of a facial profile, the other of a face facing the camera frontally – is known as a 
“mug shot” and frequently employed in prison photography.92 It follows that the 
woman depicted in Figure 2 is already implicitly criminalized as ‘socially deviant’ even 
though there is no criminal record attached to the image. Instead, the image itself be-
comes the criminal record. The measuring device and the medical register of ‘case 324’ 
suggest that this is a clinical, visual diagnosis of a ‘socially deviant,’ and cognitively 
disabled woman, a woman who is, in the eyes of the implied (eugenic) viewer, not a 
women but rather a child with a disability. I am basing this observation on the woman’s 
name as it appears in the subtitle, “Hattie,” which sounds and looks like a nickname 
rather than her full name. While a nickname suggests intimacy between the viewer and 
the person who is photographed, the fact that a nickname was chosen for the woman in 
this particular image reveals the ableist ideology of this image. It objectifies and infan-
tilizes her, making her regress back to the ‘mental age’ of a three year old, as the subtitle 
says. This mode of objectifying and gendering cognitive disability is chilling in com-
parison to Figure 1, in which physical – not cognitive – disability is normalized through 
a set of privileges that “Hattie” does not have. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture  
Issue 3 (2017): Law Undone  
www.on-culture.org  
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2017/12993/ 
 
17 
 
What contributes further to this image becoming a visual diagnosis is the fact that 
the medium close-up shot of Hattie’s face invites the spectator to study and measure 
her face in great detail. The measuring device depicts not only her height, but also the 
size of her ears, the distance from her ears to the back of her head as well as the distance 
from her ears to her chin (Figure 2). This suggests that the faces of cognitively disabled 
women are intrinsically different from their able-bodied sisters. Again, the seemingly 
‘scientific’ visual register of this image is inherently political, as it reinforces the sug-
gestion that skull size and form count as evidence for the connection biological deter-
minism has made, between facial and physical characteristics and degeneration. 
On a related note, it is important to consider that the eugenicist othering and gen-
dering of cognitive disability was not only achieved through visual means. Legal nar-
ratives of exclusion played an equally important role in the othering of disabled women, 
especially those with cognitive disabilities and epilepsy. To respond to what eugenicists 
posited to be a “menace of the feebleminded”,93 eugenic involuntary-sterilization laws 
were passed, the first one in Indiana in 1907; thirty other states followed suit in 1931.94 
US American eugenicist Harry Laughlin was a key figure in this context as he was the 
first to develop a “Model Sterilization Law” that legalized involuntary sterilization of 
people with epilepsy, cognitive and intellectual impairment, and mental illness, on the 
basis that these were “inferior hereditary potentialities” that should not be passed on 
from one generation to the next.95 The 1924 Supreme Court decision Buck v. Bell 
played an important role, as it supported and institutionalized Laughlin’s “Model Law,” 
making it a decision that is still quoted today in cases that involve issues of sterilization 
and reproductive rights.96 
To understand the politics of Buck v. Bell, one needs to turn to biological determin-
ism and atavism once more, this time in relation to gender and sexuality. As Philippa 
Levine observes, biological determinism and atavism are not only deeply racist and 
ableist but also sexist at their ideological core.97 Both paradigms present women as 
‘inferior’ because of presumed biological traits such as “smaller cranial capacity”, 
which, as eugenicists argued, leads inevitably to the subsequent degeneration of soci-
ety.98 A publication that is key in this context is Cesare Lombroso’s The Female Of-
fender, published in 1895. In The Female Offender, Lombroso employs biological de-
terminism and atavism to contrast “female sexual deviancy” in the form of “the female 
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criminal” with the “honest woman” as the gendered embodiment of female able-bod-
iedness.99 In positioning himself as another father-knows-best figure, Lombroso con-
structs the “female criminal” and marks her as ‘other’ through a rhetoric that is, similar 
to Galton’s, political in its polarization of normalcy versus deviancy. For Lombroso, 
height, weight, and hair color all serve as visual markers of “female criminality.”100 
Characteristics such as “darker hair,” “a higher weight” and “inferior cranial capacity” 
gender the racist and ableist connection biological determinism made between ‘degen-
erate’ biological traits and what was perceived as a hereditary predisposition to crime 
and criminality.101 Moreover, similarly to the “clinical gaze” of eugenic photography, 
Lombroso exhibits the women he perceives and labels as ‘deviant.’ This is reinforced 
by detailed descriptions of what Lombroso coins “lesbianism.” In Lombroso’s eyes a 
pathology, not a sexual orientation, lesbianism is caused by “excessive lustfulness,” 
which makes women “succumb [to ‘lesbianism’] in a state of intoxication.”102 As a 
consequence, the “female criminal” becomes other in multiple ways. She crosses bor-
ders of appearance and sexual orientation that marginalize, stigmatize, and gender her 
difference. The subject position of being other, in turn, becomes instrumental in bio-
logical deterministic and atavistic ideology as it marks the conceptual turn from differ-
ence to deficit.   
Furthermore, similar to eugenicists, Lombroso presents a highly problematic notion 
of intellect as an ideological benchmark. In contrasting an ‘honest’ woman’s “intensity 
of feeling and maternal sentiment” with the female criminal’s “deficiency of intellect,” 
Lombroso employs the term “intellect” to further differentiate between the two types 
of femininity.103 Returning to eugenic ideology and biological determinism, I would 
argue that by using “intellect” as another core concept in his ideology, Lombroso es-
sentializes the image of ‘the’ honest woman versus ‘the’ female criminal and antici-
pates the ways in which eugenic ideology uses IQ test scores to systematically crimi-
nalize and discriminate against individuals that were perceived to be ‘deviant.’  
In The Female Offender, however, the idea of “intellect” is not based on IQ test 
scores. Instead, it turns into a moral of its own. Lombroso uses “intellect” to mark the 
transgression from ‘the’ honest woman to ‘the’ honest mother so that motherhood, in 
Lombroso’s eyes, turns into a “moral prophylactic against crime and evil.”104 Keeping 
in mind that, in the wake of the first World War, eugenicists employed terms such as 
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‘scientific motherhood’ and ‘mothers of the nation’ to normalize and nationalize moth-
erhood,105 Lombroso’s contrast between the ‘honest woman’ and the ‘female criminal’ 
now unfolds as the binary opposition between ‘the’ able-bodied, white, upper-middle 
class mother and the criminal, pauper, disabled mother, which reifies the power relation 
between disability and able-bodiedness.  
It is precisely this distinction between disability and able-bodiedness that politicizes 
Buck v. Bell. In the case, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. rules that 
Carrie Buck, mother to a six-month-old baby and resident at the “Virginia Colony for 
Epileptics and Feebleminded” should be sterilized against her will; he bases his opinion 
on the Virginia Sterilization Act, which was passed in 1924.106 In the opening state-
ment, Holmes identifies Buck as  
A feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above 
mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same 
institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child.107 
This decision illustrates the gendering and criminalization of cognitive disability at the 
intersection of the politics of Supreme Court decisions, the politics of legal rhetoric, 
and the politics of cognitive disability. First of all, it is significant to me that Holmes 
does not refer to IQ tests or other diagnostic evaluations that might have been carried 
out to measure intellectual or cognitive impairment. Instead, Buck is diagnosed as fee-
ble-minded because she is the daughter of a woman who is presented in court as a 
“pauper” and a “prostitute.”108 The link to eugenic ideology and biological determinism 
in this statement cannot go unseen. With Buck being identified as the daughter of a 
disabled mother, cognitive disability is again framed as a “hereditary potentiality,” as 
Laughlin put it. This then leads back to The Female Offender: Buck is not only othered 
as cognitively disabled, but also criminalized for being the daughter of a prostitute, 
which eugenicists perceived to be a form of ‘deviant’ female sexuality and which fell 
under Laughlin’s “Model Law” as a form of pathology that should be eradicated.109  
The gendered criminalization of Buck as feeble-minded carries with it further con-
sequences. Having an illegitimate child was – by the normative and gendered standards 
of ‘scientific motherhood’ in US eugenic ideology – not only considered to be trespass-
ing in terms of how disabled women should behave (have no children), but also how 
white, upper-middle class women should behave (have children and be married).110 As 
a corollary, there is a visual and even theatrical component to Holmes’s rhetoric: The 
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opening statement puts Carrie Buck on the ideological spot, in a motion that is strik-
ingly similar to the visual rhetoric of eugenic photography (see Figure 2). Buck is not 
only perceived as different because she is a women and has a child without having been 
married; she is also perceived as different because she is a woman, cognitively disa-
bled, and a mother. Consequently, her disability, sexuality, and socioeconomic status 
are framed as the elements that make her woman- and motherhood pathological under 
the gaze of eugenic law. 
What plays into this mode of othering is the fact that Buck was institutionalized at 
the “Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded.”111 As already men-
tioned, disabled people were increasingly institutionalized under eugenic rule for a va-
riety of reasons and diagnoses, including not only neurological and psychiatric disabil-
ities such as epilepsy and mental illness, but also labels that were given to women who 
were perceived to be sexually ‘deviant,’ such as “nymphomania.”112 Despite the variety 
of reasons, there is still a common denominator here: the majority of these women were 
poor.113 As I have already argued, disability and poverty are closely and politically 
related, and in the context of institutionalization this relation evolves as heavily gen-
dered once more. Eugenicists believed that poverty is what makes these women’s dis-
ability “undesirable” and their femininity “socially inadequate.”114 Curiously enough, 
in Buck v. Bell Carrie Buck’s socioeconomic status remains unmentioned. Her poverty 
is neither mentioned nor is it put in relation to her “feeble-mindedness.”115 Given the 
fact that Buck suffered from severe socioeconomic hardship both before and during her 
institutionalization,116 I would argue that in the Supreme Court decision, poverty is 
naturalized as a signifier of disadvantage, which again supports biologically determin-
istic and eugenic ideology. Instead of making Buck’s financial background explicit, it 
is assumed that she is poor because she is a disabled woman who lives in an institution 
and gave birth to an illegitimate child.  
This power relation then leads to the criminalization of Carrie Buck as a disabled 
mother. In justifying forced sterilization, Holmes concludes that  
Many defective persons who if now discharged would become a menace but if 
incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-sup-
porting with benefit to themselves and to society […]. It is better for all the world, 
if instead waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve 
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who manifest unfit from continuing 
their kind. […] Three generations of imbeciles are enough.117  
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In this statement, it is striking that Buck is now objectified as one of many “defective 
persons” whose “degenerate offspring” can and in fact should be held responsible for 
crime and criminality, which reinforces atavistic and biologically deterministic beliefs 
about the disabled body. What is important to note here is that there are two ideological 
layers to the othering of Buck. She is objectified as a “defective person” and, at the 
same time, re-gendered as a criminal woman, i.e. a danger to a purportedly white, able-
bodied, and male society. Depicting Buck as a danger to society then carries further 
consequences for the politics of interpreting disability law and the politics of represen-
tation. By stereotyping Buck as a disabled female criminal, legal rule unfolds as a way 
to control deviant female sexuality through a law that is paternalistic in more than one 
sense. The fact that the decision was ruled on by a male judge and that the trial was 
held without Buck being present further reinforces the notion that this is a male major-
ity ruling over a female minority, which marginalizes the female and disabled body 
once more.118  
Returning to legal borders of belonging, I would argue that the politics of this Su-
preme Court decision are to be found in the marginalization and exclusion of the disa-
bled and female body as a body that becomes illegal under eugenic law. With Buck 
sterilized against her will, without her consent and knowledge, her right to have control 
over her own body was denied – and so was her right to legal personhood. In the context 
of Lombroso’s theories of female criminality that marked the female and disabled bio-
logical body as fundamentally inferior, Buck was denied ownership of her own biolog-
ical and legal body. This excluded her not only from a society that perceived disabled 
women as a menace but also from a legal imagination that viewed her body as asexual, 
“celibate and childless,” a form of eradicating and ultimately silencing disabled women 
under legal rule.119  
Where does all of this leave disability as a category of historical and legal analysis? 
As it has been shown, the othering of disability at the turn from the nineteenth to the 
twentieth century is highly complex. A variety of hegemonic narratives comprised the 
core of disability as other. Nationalism and US exceptionalism, eugenics and Social 
Darwinism all interpreted disability as deficit, something that should be normalized, 
hidden, locked away, and eradicated. At the same time, able-bodiedness became ideo-
logically dominant through a set of interconnected privileges, including race, gender, 
class, and legal power. Consequently, the politics of disability is not only about the 
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ways in which cognitive and physical impairment becomes visible and political in dif-
ference. Instead, it is about the ways in which the hegemony of able-bodiedness is given 
ideological form. In historical conceptualizations of disability, a legal imagination un-
folded that pictured legal personhood as the body of a white, able-bodied, and male 
citizen, while disabled people haunted the legal imagination as extra-legal ghosts. (And 
the early French Deaf culture rummaged in the ideological attic in Poltergeist-fashion). 
In this context, the politics of disability ultimately proved itself to be a politics of form. 
By paying attention to the ways in which the power relation between disability and 
able-bodiedness was constructed through visual and legal rhetoric, the disgrace of si-
lence in US history and law regarding disability as a category of historical and legal 
analysis is undone.  
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